Introduction
On the abolition of Medical Officers of Health (MOsH) in 1974, posts in community medicine were created within the NHS (whose occupants were later entitled 'Directors of Public Health'), and debates about the role and standing of the new speciality began even before the transition. The debates have continued ever since, and have often included analysis of, or assumptions about, the former role of MOsH (e.g. Refs 1-4). The second report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Health recorded in 2001, for example: 'One of the issues raised in evidence to us was the vagueness of the Director of Public Health's remit and the lack of direct power he or she could bring to their job. Our impression is that a good deal was lost with the transfer of the public health function from local government in 1974' (Ref. 5, para. 155).
The British Medical Association had claimed that Directors of Public Health were acting in an 'entrepreneurial way', but the Select Committee rejected this view. According to the Select Committee, the Directors were not generally 'providing the necessary leadership in the public health field' (Ref. 5, para. 157).
There have even been explicit calls to 'bring back the MOH' in recent years. 6 However, the response of the Department of Health for England and Wales to the Select Committee offers no such simple solution. It is clear that the Director of Public Health's role is expected to change in future, but also that much depends upon the implementation of the new Primary Care Trusts, which are responsible for general practice and related services. Primary Care Trust Boards will include a member appointed to lead a 'public health team'. This will undertake 'work of improving health and reducing inequalities' by 'integrating public health into primary care' and also 'working in partnership with local authorities and other agencies'. 7, 8 (A speech by the Health Minister, Lord Hunt, given to the Faculty of Public Health Medicine on 13 November 2001, provides further insight into the way these policies will be implemented. See http://www.fphm.org.uk/.)
In Scotland, Directors of Public Health received less critical treatment in Review of the public health function, published in December 1998, where the emphasis was upon the development of Health Boards as 'Public Health Organisations'. 9 In contrast to England, there seems to be less emphasis upon Primary Health Care Trusts' public health functions at present. As regards the role of Local Authorities, however, the Scottish Executive has recently stated that they 'want to see Local Authorities develop their role as public health organisations' and that they will 'remove barriers to closer working between NHS Boards and Local Authorities to improve public health'. 10 Existing examples of such NHS-Local Authority collaboration include the 'Health Action Zones' in England and Wales, 11 and the 'Health Improvement Programmes' in Scotland. The latter will be soon be superseded by 'Local Health Plans'. 12 These initiatives aim primarily to address problems of health inequalities, highlighted by the Black report in 1980, 13 which have gained a much higher profile on the policy agenda since the return of a Labour government in Britain in 1997. In this context, this paper and its sequel, which explore past professional strategies of leading local authority public health professionals at a time when the relationship between public health and primary care was a key consideration, may provide both inspiration and warnings.
Most scholarship on the history of public health concentrates on the nineteenth century, but Jane Lewis raised a number of questions about the status of the MOsH in the twentieth century in What price community medicine?, her book on public health since 1919.
14 In England and Wales, only the Minister of Health could remove MOsH from their posts, and the Secretary of State for Scotland was in the same position north of the border. The MOH was therefore protected against vested interests and was sometimes seen as a 'community watchdog'. On the other hand, MOsH sometimes stood accused of compliance to the wishes of the central authorities, for example in moderating their views on links between poverty and ill-health. Lewis further notes that some researchers have suggested that twentieth-century public health guided by the MOH 'lost its way' (Ref. 14, pp. 26-30, 160) . During the inter-war period MOsH built up empires centred on institutional care and many hoped that future reform of the health services would further expand their roles. When the opposite happened and they lost the municipal hospitals in 1948, demoralization set in, and the MOsH proved unable to find a viable redefinition of their role over the decades that followed. Part of the problem was that preventive medicine was overshadowed by the immense expansion of acute hospital medicine, arising from technological change and increased public funding. The professional problems facing MOsH were exacerbated by the declining importance of infectious diseases, the control of which had been central to the raison d'être of MOsH. In addition, while social work divisions of health departments expanded during the period, in 1970 in Scotland and in 1971 in England and Wales, separate social work departments were established and directors of social services were appointed.
In this journal in 1997, John Welshman posed the question of whether the MOH should be regarded as 'watchdog or lapdog?' in a paper on the role of the MOH 1900-1974. 15 In his recent book Municipal medicine: public health in twentieth-century Britain, he asks, similarly, whether the MOH was a 'villain or hero?' (Ref. 16, pp. 443-450) . This was not a question about the influence of MOsH upon disease, but was rather focused upon professional strategies. Were the MOsH complacent and unimaginative, and responsible for their own fate, or did they valiantly seek to maintain and develop public health, so their demise was more due to other circumstances? Taking the example of Leicester as a case study, Welshman showed that after 1948 the MOsH developed new work in health education, the care of unmarried mothers, mental health services and other areas. He concluded that, far from lack of initiative on the part of the MOsH, it was factors outside their control that proved decisive.
Welshman admitted, however, that Leicester may have been a special case and argued that further local studies will produce a 'more subtle, accurate and complex picture' (Ref. 16, p. 34) . This paper, on the work of Dr Ian MacQueen in Aberdeen, and a further paper on public health on Teesside, NE England, are examples of such studies. 18 He then returned to Edinburgh in 1947 and spent 5 years in central government, as a medical officer at the Department of Health for Scotland, responsible for liaising with local authority health departments. During this period he obtained his MD from Edinburgh University. However, he later commented that he was always unsuited to the 'ivory towers' of Edinburgh. When the chance came to return to local government he moved to Aberdeen on the retirement of Dr Harry Rae in 1952 (Ref. 19, p. v) .
In 1951 the Department of Health for Scotland's Standing Advisory Committee on Local Authority Services issued What local authorities can do to promote health and prevent disease, and encouraged health professionals and elected representatives to study it. MacQueen made it the subject for the introduction to his first annual report as MOH for Aberdeen. He quoted a paragraph that stated that it was a main duty of an MOH to 'study all factors affecting the health of the community, andwithout neglecting the remaining -to apply to other health problems the epidemiological and other methods which yielded such striking results in reducing infections ' (Ref. 20, p. viii) .
This statement encapsulated the feeling that much of the original role of the MOsH was obsolete and that they faced the challenge of reinventing themselves. MacQueen made it the occasion for emphasizing the need for him to be provided with information about the occurrence of disease and the discharge of patients from hospital, so he might develop a full role in co-ordinating services.
An important aspect of MacQueen's bid to place his department at the centre of the health services was the collaboration that he hoped would be established between the department's health visitors, and hospital staff and general practitioners (GPs). However, although the benefits of health visitors in aftercare were soon realized in hospital circles, GPs were sceptical as to their value. MacQueen urged health visitors to communicate directly with GPs about patients' problems that they encountered, but when the health visitors did so, GPs demanded a memorandum on health visitors' qualifications and functions. In this MacQueen alluded to suspicions among GPs that health visitors were encroaching upon their own territory. He commented that it would be 'useful if the doctor and health visitor each realised that the other was a highly trained professional person'.
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In contrast to his early remarks about the role of the MOH in the co-ordination of local authority, GP and hospital services, by the end of the 1950s MacQueen had become more concerned with 'team work' among his own staff. 22 In 1960, he compared the local authority public health department to a cricket team and the MOH to the captain. It was the captain's responsibility to decide the order of bowling, allowing successive bowlers to 'place the field' including the captain himself. The opposition, however, was not simply disease and its causes. The 'team concept', MacQueen argued, would provide 'security' for the public health team 'in a world of empire builders'. He remarked that 'as long as the team stands together and fights together, it is invincible, because no empire-builders can suddenly create a rival team', alluding to a variety of possible threats to the integrity of public health departments. 23 MacQueen's concern to preserve and extend his own local authority public health empire reflected a traditional concern of MOsH, but he was fully aware of changing circumstances and the need for innovation and a new style of leadership. By 1960 he had reached the conclusion that, in view of social and demographic changes, there were a number of new key challenges for public health. These lay in developing health education and the preservation of mental health, the care of the elderly, the aftercare of those discharged from hospital, and the prevention of non-infectious conditions such as home accidents. 23 Two years later, looking back at what he had achieved during his first 10 years in Aberdeen, he claimed that significant advances had been made in all these fields. But work in the field of infectious diseases had also continued to be important. New immunization, and prevention and screening techniques (for TB) had been introduced (Ref. 24, p. 165) .
Much of the new work depended upon the expansion of the numbers and roles of health visitors. Their statutory roles had been enhanced by the NHS (Scotland) Act, and the Department of Health for Scotland was prepared to support an expansion in their number. In Aberdeen, the establishment for health visitors was increased from 46 to 65 before MacQueen's arrival and reached 85 in 1954, a higher density than for any other Scottish city and close to MacQueen's target of 89.
25,26 Nevertheless, there were frequently more than 20 vacancies for health visitors in Aberdeen and MacQueen blamed the poor salaries and career structure. 27 MacQueen was also an advocate for male health visiting officers, and in 1961 Aberdeen became the first city in Britain to admit men to a full-time course at their Health Visitor Training School. 28 MacQueen had begun a study of home accidents by the time of his first annual report and later received a Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust grant for research in this area. 29 Health visitors played a key role in the research and in an associated home safety campaign. MacQueen was invited to prepare a report on home accidents for the World Health Organization and claimed the campaign in Aberdeen led to a reduction in home accidents by more than a third (Ref. 19 , p. x; Refs 30, 31).
In his 1953 report, MacQueen described health education as 'the most important portion of the local health authority's work'. At this time health education was delivered through the day-to-day activities of his staff but in 1956 a new campaign was launched, dubbed by the press the 'thousand salvo blitz on disease'. A thousand health education talks were to be given per year, mainly by the health visitors, but this figure was soon exceeded. A health education unit was established and MacQueen proudly boasted about the recognition that Aberdeen's health education work had achieved. In the early 1960s he began to move beyond individual and group teaching and to show an interest in the potential of newspapers, television, and radio (Ref. 19 In some areas, for example maternal and infant welfare and immunization, local authority health departments were in competition with GPs. In Aberdeen, however, MacQueen's health visitors helped to ensure that the municipal services remained well utilized. Between 1952 and 1962 there was a significant increase in the number of clients attending antenatal clinics, and in the case of postnatal clinics there was only a slight decline. One possible solution to the problems of health visitor-GP communication and competition was to attach health visitors to group general practices, as was being pioneered elsewhere, notably Oxford. 33 In Aberdeen, the first experimental attachment of a health visitor to a group practice in Scotland was established in 1959. However, further developments in this area were slow partly because of staff shortages and partly because MacQueen was inclined to claim that 'health visitors could do a lot of the work that doctors did'. Understandably, that 'didn't go down too well' with the GPs. 34 MacQueen's enthusiasm for health education, the existence of his large and dedicated team of health visitors, and his difficult relationship with GPs, all proved of consequence in his handling of the typhoid outbreak of 1964, to which we will now turn.
The typhoid outbreak, 1964
The typhoid outbreak began in the middle of May 1964 and by the end of the month the source was traced to corned beef that had been sold in slices at the cold meat counter of a supermarket. There was eventually a total of nearly 500 cases, but it became possible to sound the 'all clear' after about a month. The outbreak allowed MacQueen an opportunity to return to an original role of MOsH in infectious disease control. However, because the local authority's infectious diseases hospital and laboratory had been handed over to the NHS, he was unable to exert such direct control as had been possible for former MOsH. The management of the outbreak therefore depended more upon communication and co-operation between different branches of the health services than would have previously been the case. Unfortunately, MacQueen's previous overriding concern with protecting and extending the role of the public health team had not created the conditions for this effective communication and co-operation to be rapidly established.
MacQueen deployed his health visitors in contact tracing and taking samples for analysis, which led to the swift identification of the source of the outbreak. But his lack of communication with GPs, the regional laboratory, and the hospitals, especially during the early stages of the outbreak, was criticized both locally and in the report of the official enquiry into the outbreak (the Milne report), which appeared in December 1964. 35 The Milne report also attacked MacQueen's media strategy, commenting that during his press conferences 'a number of dramatic statements were made in order to encourage the citizens of Aberdeen to obey those edicts of hygienic practice which Dr MacQueen felt to be essential'. One result, 'which affected not only Aberdeen and to a lesser extent the rest of Scotland, and had repercussions internationally, was to give the outbreak … the status of a national disaster' (Ref. 35 , p. 69). The report suggested that a daily press statement rather than press conferences would have been sufficient to achieve the health education objectives. This view, however, was not that of The Medical Officer, which at the height of the outbreak alluded to MacQueen's achievements in the field of health education and reported: 'Dr MacQueen has been holding daily press conferences during most of the course of the epidemic with the result that this has probably been the best 'covered' outbreak of its kind.… it is fortunate that Aberdeen's population has been so accustomed to accepting guidance on health matters'. 36 In January 1965 MacQueen used the same journal to counterattack the Milne Committee. He argued that the Committee's views could be ruled out on the grounds that 'publicity aspects were completely outside its remit' and 'the Committee took no evidence from any health education officer, public relations officer, journalist, television producer or publicity expert of any type'. 37 MacQueen's colleagues in the Scottish branch of the Society for the Medical Officers of Health, of which he was a former president, supported him. They set up a sub-committee to investigate the findings of the Milne Committee and concluded that the report had treated MacQueen unfairly and commented that 'the Medical Officer of Health did his work well. It should be noted that there were very few secondary cases. Publicity played a part in this and helped to have the cases detected earlier. ' 
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MacQueen after typhoid, 1964-1972
MacQueen's performance in the typhoid outbreak appears to have caused no permanent damage in terms of his standing in the world of health education. In 1970, he was elected chair of the Scottish Health Education Council, and in 1972 became a member of the Chief Medical Officers' Advisory Committee on Health Education (Ref. 19, p. 12; Ref. 39, p. 13) . And, despite the offence that MacQueen gave to GPs as a result of his handling of the outbreak, during the years that followed, the development of the health visitor attachment scheme gathered pace.
After the first experimental attachment in 1959, a second scheme began in 1961. In his report for 1964, MacQueen alluded to the many recent articles in medical journals on health visitor attachment. Some of Aberdeen's GPs, it seems, were keen to keep up with national trends, but MacQueen observed that many health visitors were 'not convinced that complete attachment is the best method of achieving good co-operation and co-ordination'. 40 But the scheme subsequently expanded, as elsewhere, following the introduction of new financial arrangements for GPs -the concept of the 'health care team' with the GP taking a leading role, dating from this period. 41 MacQueen, however, was by no means ready to embrace this concept with enthusiasm. Earlier, when comparing the public health department to a cricket team, he had also spoken of the health services as a whole as a football team, with the MOH as centre forward, flanked by his colleagues, the GPs in mid-field, and the hospital services as backs and in goal. 23 He was reluctant to concede the leading position to the GP.
Nevertheless During the 1960s MacQueen introduced a number of new services. Encouraged by the professor of obstetrics and gynaecology of Aberdeen University, all contraception, including the pill, was made free at the family planning clinics in 1967, and unmarried women were included in the client base. 43 Some citizens were outraged, a letter appearing in a local paper under the heading 'Christ gave no licence to sin'. 44 The numbers of new attendees at the clinics rose by over 50 per cent and the number of unwanted pregnancies declined.
In discussing the separation of social work from his department, MacQueen was resigned to this depletion of his public health team and emphasized that the health department would remain large and complex. He even made some virtue of the changes, suggesting that the loss of responsibility for old people's homes and occupation centres would allow the department to 'at last have time to tackle the improvement of physical, emotional, mental and environmental health' (Ref. 45 
MacQueen's strategy: innovative traditionalism
In conclusion, we suggest that MacQueen's overall profession strategy is best described as 'innovative traditionalism'. In the sequel to this paper, focusing on Teesside, the strategy of another MOH will be discussed and an additional descriptive phrase suggested.
